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Welfare effects of commons and anticommons dilemmas 
From “tragedy” to “disaster”: Welfare effects of commons and anticommons 
dilemmas  
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we explore the alleged symmetry between commons and anticommons 
dilemmas. Our experimental results reveal an interesting asymmetry. Anticommons situations 
generate greater opportunistic behavior than an equivalent commons dilemma (Study 1), and 
anticommons dilemmas yield a greater risk for underuse compared to commons dilemmas 
(Study 2).   
The results of the present study bring to light important deviations from the economic 
model, suggesting that other factors, such as behavioral attitudes towards property and 
psychological variables, affect cooperation differently in anticommons and commons 
dilemmas. Our findings complement the existing experimental literature on commons 
dilemmas and contradict the presumed economic symmetry of commons and anticommons 
problems. The identification of relevant parameters constitutes an interesting line of future 
research. Such research could identify the parameters that differentiate between the behavioral 
outcomes imposed by the two dilemma types, and identify subjective factors that underlie 
people’s behavior in anticommons dilemmas. Our research attests to the potential gravity of 
the anticommons problem, and we conclude that it is inadequate to extrapolate findings from 
the commons to the anticommons dilemma. 
 
 2
Welfare effects of commons and anticommons dilemmas 
From “tragedy” to “disaster”: Welfare effects of commons and anticommons 
dilemmas  
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last three decades economists, psychologists, philosophers and political 
scientists showed a growing interest in research on social dilemmas. According to Kopelman, 
Weber, and Messick (2002), social dilemmas can be defined by three core characteristics. 
First, a noncooperative choice is always more profitable to the individual than a cooperative 
choice, regardless of the cooperativeness of others.  Second, a noncooperative choice is 
always harmful to others compared to a cooperative choice.  Third, the aggregate amount of 
harm done to others by a noncooperative choice is greater than the individual’s profit. Thus, 
these particular situations are characterized by a direct conflict between private incentives and 
public interests and therefore constitute a “social dilemma.” 
In the commons dilemma individuals decide how much they take from a limited and 
depletable common resource. A standard result of the analysis of the use of common property 
is that under open access conditions, powerful incentives for overutilization emerge. Because 
individuals do not consider the full social costs of their activities, total use by all parties 
exceeds the natural limit and eventually leads to the complete destruction of the common 
good. Depletion of minerals and oil reserves, deforestation, and extinction of species because 
of overfishing and overhunting represent real world examples of this process. Hardin (1968) 
described this process of overuse of common resources as the “tragedy of the commons.”  
More recently a new concept surfaced in the literature on common property. This 
concept, first introduced by Michelman (1982) and then made popular by Heller (1998) and 
others, mirror images in name and fact Hardin’s (1968) well-known tragedy of the commons. 
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An “anticommons,” a property regime in which two or more joint owners hold effective rights 
to prohibit one another from utilizing a scarce resource, creates conditions for underuse of the 
common resource (Heller, 1998). Under competitive conditions, each co-owner has incentives 
to block access to the common resources for other users, although the use of the common 
resource by one party could yield net benefits. Thus, because multiple holders of exclusion 
rights do not fully internalize the cost created by enforcing their right to exclude others, the 
common resource will remain idle even in the economic region of positive marginal 
productivity. Following Michelman (1982), Heller (1998), and Heller & Eisenberg (1998), the 
legal and economic literature refers to this process of underusing common resources as the 
“tragedy of the anticommons.”  
For instance, Heller and Eisenberg (1998) applied the concept of the anticommons to 
ownership of intellectual property rights in biomedical research. Biomedical research has 
been shifting from a commons, where the result of publicly funded research is freely available 
in the public domain, to a model in which private investment spurs the pace of upstream 
research. However, downstream product developers face a considerable bargaining problem 
because they need to solicit licenses from many upstream patent right-holders before they can 
develop new products and bring them to the market. According to Heller and Eisenberg, 
granting too many patent rights in pre-market or upstream biomedical research might stifle 
discovery of life saving products downstream. Hence, in solving the commons tragedy, 
privatization can go astray and unintentionally create a tragedy of the anticommons, 
provoking the underuse of scarce resources because too many owners block access to the 
common resources.  
 Commons and anticommons are symmetrically related to one another (Buchanan & 
Yoon, 2000; Heller, 2001; Parisi, Schulz and Depoorter, 2005) and can be framed within a 
unified conception of property. According to the traditional conception of property, owners 
 4
Welfare effects of commons and anticommons dilemmas 
enjoy a complementary bundle of rights over their property including, among other things, the 
right to use the property and the right to exclude others from it. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
 As can be seen in Figure 1, commons and anticommons conditions can be conceived 
as symmetric deviations from the standard bundle of rights, whereby the rights of use and 
exclusion are in balance. Thus, in commons situations, the right to use stretches beyond the 
effective right (or power) to exclude others. Conversely, in an anticommons property regime, 
the co-owners’ right of use is crowded out by an overshadowing right of exclusion held by 
other co-owners.  
 
Welfare effects of commons and anticommons 
 
 In modeling commons and anticommons problems, the recent literature has 
evidenced symmetrical welfare effects from overuse and underuse of the common resource 
(see Buchanan, & Yoon, 2000; Parisi et al., 2005). The cited literature analyzes the behavior 
of sellers of a certain good in a market characterized by a monotonically decreasing demand 
function P = p(Q), with p’ < 0. Goods are produced at non-decreasing marginal costs MC ! 0. 
In the case of unified property, a single owner faces a downward sloping demand curve and 
will sell at MR = MC, maximizing total profit. It is worthwhile remarking that the results of 
the monopoly case hold for any subset of the bundle of property rights, be those 
complementary exclusion rights or substitutable use rights. Regimes of commons and 
anticommons generate symmetrical (inefficient) departures from the standard benchmark of 
privatized property. For illustration purposes and without loss of generality, consider a case 
where owners face MC = 0 and a linear demand function for their property ! = PQ = VQ – 
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Q2. Owners can sell exploitation rights on their property and sell the remaining part to the 
market. The first order condition for the single owner’s maximum yields: Q = V / 2; P = V / 2; 
and ! = V2 / 4.  Let’s now consider the equilibrium achievable in a commons situation. Here 
we have several co-owners each capable of selling exploitation rights over the common 
resource. However, the demand and price are affected by the quantity of exploitation rights 
sold by the other co-owners. By doing so, each co-owner i solves the following maximization 
problem: 
 
Max !i = PQi = (V – Qi – " j!i Qj ) Qi = VQi – Qi2 – Qi "Qj (1) 
  
 
With co-owner i assuming that #Qj / #Qi = 0, the first order conditions for a maximum are #!I  
/ #Qi = V – 2Qi – "Qj . The n co-owner reaction functions can be solved simultaneously for the 
equilibrium values of exploitation rights Qi and Qj to yield Qi = Qj = V / n + 1; with a total supply of 
exploitation rights nV / n + 1; and P = V – "Qj = V / n + 1. As expected, in this case the quantity sold 
increases and the price falls as the number of co-owners increases. 
Having derived the price and quantity of exploitation rights under the commons 
regime, we can now look at the symmetric case of anticommons. The comparison between the 
two reveals the mathematical symmetry between commons and anticommons dilemmas. 
Consider co-owners in an anticommons regime. Exploitation rights can be granted to a third 
party only if every co-owner agrees to the transfer. Co-owners decide independently of one 
another and can set different prices for their consent to transfer exploitation rights. This is the 
case analyzed by Buchanan and Yoon (2000), and Parisi et al. (2005), as a model of the 
anticommons problem. The third party’s decision to purchase exploitation rights will be 
driven by the total price, which is given by the sum of the prices independently charged by the 
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various co-owners, "i=1,...n Pi. Thus, in setting his price, co-owner i faces the following 
problem: 
 
Max !i = PQi = (V – Pi – " j!i Pj ) Pi = VPi – Pi2 – Pi "j!i Pj              (2)  
 
Assuming that co-owner i chooses his price assuming that #Pj / #Pi = 0 (i.e., using the 
Nash assumption that considers all other players’ prices as given) the first order conditions for 
a maximum are #!i / #Pi = V – 2Pi – "Pj. The n co-owner reaction functions can be solved 
simultaneously for the equilibrium values of Pi and Pj to yield Pi = Pj = V / n + 1; with a total 
price of nV / n + 1; Q = V – Pi – "Pj = V / n + 1.  As the number of co-owners increases, the 
total price for the exploitation rights increases and the quantity purchased is reduced. In the 
limit (n$%$&) the price of the exploitation rights becomes arbitrarily high and no units are 
sold. 
 
Commons Private Property  Anticommons 
P = V/(n+1) 
Q = nV/(n+1) 
Q = V / 2  
P = V / 2 
P = nV/(n+1) 
Q = V/(n+1) 
 
  
 The economic model generates predictions summarized in the above table on the 
(inversely) symmetric behavior of players in commons and anticommons problems. These 
predictions assume the strategic rationality of the players involved. In the present study, we 
test these predictions to explore which other factors, such as different behavioral attitudes 
towards property and psychological variables, affect cooperation in these dilemmas. If the 
results of the present study bring to light important deviations from the economic model, then 
this suggests that other variables, which are not captured in the strategic economic models of 
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commons and anticommons, are at work. In particular, this may support the idea that 
psychological variables influence people’s behavior differently in anticommons and commons 
dilemmas. Such a finding would complement the existing experimental literature on commons 
dilemmas (see, e.g., Ostrom et al. 2002; Kopelman, et al., 2002) and would contradict the 
presumed economic symmetry of commons and anticommons problems.  
 
The present studies 
 
 
 In the naturally occurring world property regimes are relatively fixed. A comparison 
of the behavioral consequences of equivalent commons and anticommons dilemmas cannot be 
achieved through manipulation and, because field data would not allow for examining the 
research question without noise, the use of experiments is warranted. The aim of the present 
research is to compare in an experimental setting participants’ bids in anticommons and 
commons dilemmas. Rather than trying to predict the exact amount of money sought in these 
two types of dilemma - as one would expect from a normative model of game behavior – our 
explicit goal was to address the question of whether the type of dilemma type affects the 
participants’ bids. That is, by creating two situations that were equivalent in all respects but 
one (i.e., the type of dilemma), we were able to attribute eventual differences in the 
participants’ behavior to the manipulated variable. This might support the thesis that 
psychological variables, such as framing and endowment effects (Kahneman, Knetsch, & 
Thaler, 1991; Andreoni, 1995), influence commons and anticommons dilemmas differently. 
 In Study 1, we conducted an interactive board game with two identical common 
properties. One of these properties operated under commons property rights, while the other 
was defined as an anticommons dilemma. In Study 2, we presented scenarios that described 
either a commons or an anticommons dilemma in order to investigate whether the 
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anticommons dilemma would yield higher prices than the equivalent commons dilemma. The 
combination of these two methodologies allowed us to benefit from the strengths of each 
method while also mitigating their weaknesses. That is, a lab study allows one to assess actual 
behavior in a controlled environment, leading to findings with a high internal validity. The 
use of a scenario experiment enables one to draw conclusions while maintaining a relatively 
high degree of mundane realism, leading to high levels of external validity. 
 
Study 1 
 
 In Study 1, participants’ interactions with two common goods were tested. Both goods 
were analogous in all respects, but they were different with respect to the governing property 
regime: One of the goods was subject to an anticommons property regime, while the other 
good was subject to a commons property regime. Research Question 1 explored whether 
participants would request a greater amount of money in the anticommons dilemma than in 
the commons dilemma. 
 
Participants 
 
Twenty-five undergraduate and five master students in psychology volunteered for this 
lab study (13 males and seven females). The students had a mean age of 22.30 years (SD = 
5.55) and had not previously taken courses in economics. A research assistant who did not 
know the participants conducted the experiment. 
 
Procedure 
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of the board games, each played with three 
players (A, B and C), and instructed (see Appendix A). At the start of the board game, each 
participant received 20 000 € as initial capital, as well as a property (indicated as A, B, and C 
on the board depicted in Figure 2). Four objects were located on each property and players 
were able to sell these objects for 2 000 € if they needed money (no players sold their 
objects).  
The aim of this game was to make as much profit as possible. Players move around the 
board by throwing a die, starting in each trial with player A, followed by players B and C. 
When players “visited” the property of another player, they had to pay an amount of 2 000 € 
to the owner (if there were only three, two, or one object(s) on the property, visitors paid 1 
500, 1 000, or 500 € respectively). 
Each participant was co-owner of two amusement parks, named “Ballibi” and 
“Bollewaerde” (see Figure 2). Every time a player visited one of these parks, (s)he received a 
monetary reward, dependent upon the number of objects present (2,000 € when four of more 
objects were present, 1,500 € for three objects, and so on). Both parks also had a growth rate, 
and after seven turns a new object was added. 
Ballibi, the first amusement park, was defined as a commons. On every seventh turn, 
each player could request as much money as they wanted. However, in return, an equivalent 
number of objects were removed from the commons. For example, if players A, B, and C ask 
0 €, 2 000 € and 10 000 € respectively, a total of six attractions were withdrawn from Ballibi. 
Players were allowed to ask for any amount, but if the amount sought surpassed the value of 
the objects on Ballibi, the bank would subtract 4 000 € from the deficit during the next seven 
turns. In fact, participants were instructed that they “even could ask 1 million €.”  
Bollewaerde, the second park, operated in an anticommons property regime and could 
be privatized by the players. This park was divided into two parts. On every seventh turn, 
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each player could bid on one of the two parts of Bollewaerde. Importantly, they also had to 
indicate their reservation price of willingness-to-accept when another player wished to acquire 
a part of Bollewaerde. After the players placed their bids, the bank checked whether the 
highest bid surpassed the sum of the asking prices of the two other players. If so, the highest 
bidder paid the other two players and acquired the property. Otherwise, no player acquired 
any part of Bollewaerde. When privatization of a part of Bollewaerde occurred, the other 
players had to pay 2 000 € for every subsequent visit (when four objects were present). 
 The game consisted of 35 turns and the players had five opportunities to indicate the 
amount of money they wanted to (1) take from the commons property Ballibi, (2) pay for a 
part of the anticommons property Bollewaerde, or (3) demand for selling a part of 
Bollewaerde. Participants were not informed how many turns they would receive. At the end 
of the game, each player’s property was counted. That is, we summed their cash money, 
determined the value of their properties, and included their share (i.e., 1/3) of the commons. 
The latter amount could be negative if the players had created a deficit in Ballibi. 
 Two other issues are worth mentioning. First, at the start of the game players were told 
that they could borrow money from the bank at any time. However, this money had to be 
reimbursed to the bank at the end of the game. Second, if both parts of Bollewaerde were 
privatized during the game, an extra part was added to allow players to further acquire private 
property1. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
 
Results 
 
                                                 
1 Only one group privatized the two parts of Bollewaerde before play ended, so this procedure 
was applied only once.  
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Because data collected from individuals in the same group are not statistically 
independent2, the present analyses rely on the group mean as the unit of analysis. The money 
players took from Ballibi and the selling price of a Bollewaerde part on each of the five  
sequences constituted the relevant behavioral data in the commons and anticommons 
respectively. To answer Research Question 1 (see Figure 3), a two (dilemma, anticommons 
versus commons) X five (seven-turn sequences, one through five) repeated measures analysis 
of variance was conducted. It was revealed that the average value taken from the commons, M 
= 4 523, was significantly smaller than the average price asked for the anticommons, M = 26 
797, F(1,9) = 13.26, p < .05. Pairwise t-tests confirmed that these differences were significant 
for each of the five seven-turn sequences, ts > 2.52, p < .053. 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
 The F-values for the effect of the seven-turn sequences and the interaction between 
type of dilemma and sequence did not exceed the conventional significance levels, Fs < 3.08, 
n.s.  
 
Discussion 
 
Regarding Research Question 1, our first study reveals that participants demand a 
higher amount of money for resources within an anticommons property regime than they take 
                                                 
2 Because of the strategic interaction between the group members within each group, data on 
the individual group members are statistically dependent, and therefore the use of aggregated 
group level data is recommended (Myers, DiCecco, & Lorch, 1981). 
3 One group had already privatized the two parts of Bollewaerde after three sequences. Re-
analysis of the differences between commons and anticommons revealed that the difference 
for the fourth sequence remained significant, t = 3.09, p < .01, whereas this difference 
approached significance for the fifth sequence, t = 1.98, p < .10.  
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from a similar resource in a commons property regime. This suggests that anticommons and 
commons do not necessarily represent symmetrical problems, but rather that the “tragedy of 
the anticommons” presents a greater social threat (underuse from blocking the use of 
resources by posting very high selling prices) than the commons dilemma (overuse of 
resources). 
 
Study 2 
 
 Study 1 shows that people ask higher prices in the anticommons than the monetary 
amount they take from the commons. However, it remains a possibility that the negative 
consequences of the dilemmas were hidden from the participants because they did not fully 
comprehend the situation or because overuse is a more familiar problem than the more 
ambiguous concept of underuse. Therefore, the question arises whether participants will also 
show a suboptimal management of their property when the potential dangers of the situation 
are made clear to them, or, alternatively stated, when the social dilemma is stated more 
explicitly. Clearly, when a similar effect of dilemma type is obtained under these 
circumstances, this reduces the risk that the differences observed in Study 1 are attributable to 
ambiguity or unfamiliarity with the concept of “underuse.” In order to enhance the salience of 
the consequences of the actors’ behavior, Study 2 assessed the probability that the source 
would be exhausted in the commons, as well as the probability that the buyer would agree 
with the selling price posted in the anticommons.  
In Study 2, scenarios describing either a commons or an anticommons dilemma were 
presented to investigate whether the anticommons dilemma yields higher prices than an 
equivalent commons dilemma. The use of these two methodologies was preferred because in 
combining these methods we benefit from the strengths of each method, and compensate for 
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the weaknesses of each method with the strengths of the other method. That is, a lab study 
allows one to assess actual behavior in a controlled environment, leading to findings with a 
high internal validity. The use of a scenario experiment enables one to draw conclusions while 
maintaining a relatively high degree of mundane realism, leading to high levels of external 
validity. 
 
The following hypotheses were tested in Study 2: 
 
 Hypothesis 1: Participants in the anticommons dilemma request an amount of money 
that is higher than the threshold of 100 percent certainty that the buyer will agree. 
Hypothesis 2: Participants in the commons dilemma request an amount of money that 
is higher than the threshold of 100 percent certainty of resource replenishment. 
Hypothesis 3: Participants in the anticommons dilemma request more money than 
participants in the commons dilemma. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
A total of 258 undergraduate students at Ghent University (106 male and 152 female 
students, average age 18.68 years, SD = 2.76 years) participated in one of the two scenario 
studies as part of a classroom assignment. They individually completed the questionnaire. 
They had not followed any economics class. 
 
Design 
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two dilemmas (anticommons or 
commons) and were presented one of two scenarios (see Appendix B). The timber company 
scenario was adapted from Sheldon and McGregor (2000) and the oil well scenario was 
written for the present study. Besides some relevant changes, these scenarios were completely 
analogous. The situation and the actors described in the scenario were purely hypothetical. 
Participants were always assigned to the role of co-owner A.   
 
Procedure 
 
The description of the procedure is based on the timber company scenario. Participants 
first read the scenario and subsequently made a bid. Participants confronted the following 
situation: “You are co-owner of a forest. In addition to your own timber company, four other 
co-owning companies operate in the same region.” Participants further read a text dependent 
upon the experimental condition. In the anticommons condition, the scenario described a 
situation in which the danger of underuse was mentioned, whereas in the commons condition 
the pertinent danger of overuse was mentioned. 
In the anticommons condition, it was thus asserted: “At this very moment co-owner B 
wants to cut part of the forest, but the four other companies (including yourself) have to grant 
their permission. You should know that the amount of forest gained by B cannot be cut by 
you in a later phase. You should also know that there is some regeneration because the trees 
in the forest grow each year and as a result the forest can regenerate itself to some extent. Of 
course, if every year the forest is used to a substantial degree, it is obvious that the forest will 
eventually disappear.  
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Owner B wants to compensate you financially for the part of the forest (s)he wants to 
cut. You do not know the exact profit gained by owner B in this case. However, it is certain 
that owner B will try to minimize his/her risks by giving a maximum amount of money. In 
other words, when the selling price rises, the chances diminish that B will buy part of the 
forest. The total amount of money you can ask B to pay ranges from 0 € to 60 000 €. 
If all companies restrict their asking price to a maximum of 10 000 €, then it is 100 
percent certain that B will buy the forest. One obvious danger is that the companies ask too 
much money for their property, making it very likely that B will not buy part of the forest, 
leaving the other companies (A, C, D and E) “out in the cold.” Thus, it may be to the four 
companies’ collective advantage to make smaller bids. However, another danger is that a 
company will not do as well because it asks less money than the other three companies. Thus, 
it may be to each company’s individual advantage to make larger bids. It is possible that B 
will buy a part of the forest if, for example, two companies ask large amounts of money and 
the other company asks a small selling price.” 
Finally, participants were reminded of the danger of underuse of the anticommons: 
“We remind you that when all companies ask a high price there is a risk that B will not buy 
the forest, leaving it underused and unproductive.” They then made a bid and marked their 
choice on the following pay-off scheme4 5. 
 
                                                 
4 The payoff schemes used in the commons and anticommons conditions consisted – from the 
amount of 10 000 € on - of a linear association between monetary value and probability of 
regeneration and buying respectively. We have chosen to use a linear association in the 
present experiment because of its apparent simplicity. The use of complex rules would make 
the dilemma more difficult to comprehend. By choosing this linear function we do not want to 
imply that a linear function would be present in naturally occurring world circumstances. 
5 In order to test that participants fully understood the pay-off scheme we asked them to 
indicate the amount of money required so that the buyer will certainly buy the property (10 
000 €), as well as to indicate the amount of money that certainly would induce the buyer to 
forsake acquiring the property (60 000  €). These questions were answered correctly by 77.42 
percent and 87.90 percent of the participants in the anticommons condition.  
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Table 1: Payoff matrix – Anticommons dilemma 
I ask a value of… €  Probability that B wants to buy 
part of the forest, so that the 
forest is no longer unproductive 
 
0 
5 000 
10 000 
15 000 
20 000 
25 000 
30 000 
35 000 
40 000 
45 000 
50 000 
55 000 
60 000 
100% 
100% 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
 
In the commons condition, it was asserted: “Each year you have to make a bid 
stipulating how many hectares of forest you want to cut. You do not know how many hectares 
the other companies plan to cut. There is some regeneration of the forest because new trees 
grow each year and hence the forest can regenerate itself to some extent. The forest area you 
can cut will be expressed as an equivalent amount of money ranging between 0 € and 60 000 
€. 
If all companies restrict their harvests to a maximum of 10 000 €, then it is 100 percent 
certain that the forest regenerates itself completely. One obvious danger is that the forest 
eventually will be cut above the sustainable yield, leaving all five companies “out in the 
cold.” Thus, it may be to the five companies’ collective advantage to limit their harvests. 
However, another potential danger is that a company does not want to gain less than the other 
four companies. Thus, it may be to each company’s individual advantage to make larger bids. 
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However, the forest may also be preserved if, for example, two companies make large bids 
and two companies make small bids. 
Finally, participants were reminded of the danger of overuse of the common property: 
“We remind you that when all companies ask a high harvest there is a risk that the forest 
becomes overused and unproductive.”  They then filled out a payoff scheme6 that was 
completely analogous to the anticommons dilemma, with the exception that the percentages 
had another label.  
 
Table 2: Payoff matrix – Commons dilemma 
I take a value of… €  Probability that the forest 
regenerates itself, so that the 
forest is no longer exhausted 
 
0 
5 000 
10 000 
15 000 
20 000 
25 000 
30 000 
35 000 
40 000 
45 000 
50 000 
55 000 
60 000 
100% 
100% 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
 
Results 
 
                                                 
6 In order to test that participants fully understood the pay-off scheme we asked them to 
indicate the amount of money required so that the property will certainly regenerate itself (10 
000 €), as well as to indicate the amount of money required to exhaust the forest (60 000  €). 
These questions were answered correctly by 83.97 percent and 78.63 percent of the 
participants in the commons condition. 
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The results of Study 2 corroborate all of our hypotheses. Figure 4 shows the means for 
the commons and anticommons dilemma condition for each of the three scenarios. In line 
with Hypothesis 1, stating that anticommons lead to underuse, analysis of the bids revealed 
that participants asked an amount of money that significantly exceeded the 10,000 € 
threshold. This result was obtained with each of the two scenarios: M = 27 397, SD = 10 643, 
F(1, 72) = 195,06, p < .001 for the oil well scenario, and M = 29 151 SD = 14 269, F(1, 52) = 
95.48, p < .001 for the timber company scenario respectively. 
 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
 
In line with Hypothesis 2, the bids in the commons condition reveal that participants 
asked an amount of money exceeding the threshold of 10 000 € that guaranteed regeneration 
of the forest. This result was obtained for each scenario: M = 17 706, SD = 8 713, F(1, 84) = 
66.48, p < .001 for the oil well scenario, and M = 17 553, SD = 11 367, F(1, 46) = 20.75, p < 
.001 for the timber company scenario. 
In line with Hypothesis 3, it was shown that participants made significantly higher 
bids in the anticommons than in the commons dilemma condition, F(1, 156) = 39.59, p < 
.001, and F(1, 98) = 19.86, p < .001 for the oil well and timber company scenario 
respectively7.  
 
Discussion 
 
                                                 
7 Re-analysis of the data with exclusion of the participants who did not correctly answer the 
questions with respect to the pay-off scheme remained highly significant (Fs = 22.23 and 
18.72 for the oil well and timber company scenarios respectively).  
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The results of Study 2 corroborate our hypotheses. Both scenario studies confirm that 
when selling off parts in a common resource, individuals set high prices that make it likely 
that that the buyers forego the opportunity to utilize the jointly owned resource (Hypothesis 
1), which is a danger of underuse because the jointly owned good remains idle. Another 
finding was that people consistently harvest more resources of a limited good, posing a real 
threat for the replenishment of the commons (Hypothesis 2) , a relative overuse of the 
commons8. Finally, both studies revealed that the bids were significantly higher in the 
anticommons than in the commons dilemma, thus revealing an experimental asymmetry in the 
otherwise symmetric commons and anticommons problems (Hypothesis 3).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Buchanan and Yoon (2000) and Schulz, Parisi, and Depoorter (2003) proposed a 
theoretical model implying that anticommons and commons tragedies are exact mirror images 
of each other. This model leads them to expect that the severity of underuse (in anticommons 
dilemmas) and overuse (in commons dilemmas) should be equal. However, the present 
studies empirically document that anticommons seem to elicit more individualistic behavior 
than commons dilemmas. Moreover, these results were obtained with different methodologies 
(i.e., lab experiment versus scenario experiment), different research designs (i.e., 
simultaneous presentation of the two types of dilemma resulting in a within-subjects design 
versus presentation of different dilemmas in a between-subjects design), and different 
modalities (e.g., free bidding versus the use of a pay-off scheme), attesting to the stability of 
these findings and their broad generality. 
                                                 
8 By using a single trial game in Study 2 one could expect a lower concern for conserving the 
common good. As a result, the dilemma type effect might be even larger when more than one 
trial is involved. 
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Our results unequivocally supported the proposition that anticommons yields higher 
prices than the commons dilemma (Study 1) and that anticommons dilemmas are more prone 
to underuse than commons dilemmas are to overuse (Study 2). If commons lead to “tragedy” 
(see Hardin, 1968), anticommons may well lead to “disaster.”  
These findings have very important policy implications. Given the greater levels of 
wealth dissipation induced by anticommons problems, commons regimes may be preferable 
whenever functional units of private property cannot be established. For example, whenever it 
is not possible to divide the common garden of a condominium building, commons regimes 
may be preferred to anticommons regimes. Condominium owners should be allowed to use 
the common resource without needing others’ permission. Even though this regime may lead 
to an overuse of the common resource, the resulting inefficiency would be lower than the 
inefficiency generated by an anticommons regime, where condominium owners could use the 
common garden only when all others gave them permission to do so.  More generally, the 
present results suggest that privatization of commons property should be implemented with 
caution to avoid transforming a commons tragedy into an anticommons disaster.  
Clearly, there are important behavioral effects when anticommons property 
entitlements are created. Anticommons owners have a right to exclude others and a right to 
veto any transformation of the common resource. The prerogatives of an anticommons owner 
are perceived as something that they “own,” and psychological attitudes are triggered for the 
protection of such entitlement. No sense of “harm” is associated with one’s exercise of the 
property right, even though others may suffer a possible economic prejudice. Commons users 
instead do not perceive their opportunity to use the commons as something that they own. 
When overexploiting a common resource, they fully realize that they are imposing an 
economic prejudice to others and partially restrain from such abusive behavior. 
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Why, then, do people ask higher prices in the anticommons dilemma than the 
monetary amount they would simply take from an equivalent commons dilemma? One type of 
possible explanations refers to perception and psychology. It is possible that the implications 
of the anticommons dilemma are much more ambiguous than those of the commons dilemma. 
In particular, future implications in the anticommons dilemma may be much more ambiguous 
than in the commons dilemma (see Schulz et al., 2003). Indeed, given its prevalence in the 
real world, most people readily comprehend that unrestrained use of common resources leads 
to total depletion of resources in the long run, and that those who take more than their share 
out of the commons preclude others from partaking of its benefits. However, it should be 
noted that while this explanation might be true for our first study, the consequences of asking 
high prices has been clarified in the instructions of our scenario experiment.  
Another possibility is that framing the anticommons dilemma as a “selling problem” 
rather than as a “sharing problem” lies at the heart of the marked differences between 
commons and anticommons dilemmas. That is, many studies have shown that people often 
demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it 
(Kahneman et al., 1991). 
Some important limitations of the present studies should also be mentioned. The 
present research was aimed at showing the gravity of the potential problems accompanying 
anticommons dilemmas. However, this research should only be considered a necessary first 
step, and the replication of the present results with other designs, methods, and experimental 
situations is needed to fully substantiate the claim that the anticommons dilemma poses a 
greater threat to the collective welfare than comparable commons dilemmas. If the detrimental 
effects of the anticommons property regime are fully acknowledged, the next logical steps for 
future research are twofold. First, from the viewpoint of economic science, the identification 
of parameters - in general models - that can be used to predict theoretically derived outcomes 
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constitutes an interesting line of future research. In particular, such research could identify the 
parameters that differentiate between the behavioral outcomes imposed by the two dilemma 
types. Secondly, from a psychological point of view, the identification of subjective factors 
that underlie people’s behavior in the anticommons dilemma constitutes an important yet 
unexplored avenue for future research. 
In conclusion, the present research attests to the potential gravity of the anticommons 
problem. These results suggest that it is inadequate to extrapolate findings from the commons 
to the anticommons dilemma. 
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Appendix A 
 
This game looks like a traditional Monopoly game. The aim of the game is to collect 
as much profit as possible. Every player starts with two properties (“streets”), with a hotel on 
each (equalling the value of four houses). Every time another player lands on your property, 
(s)he has to pay you a monetary reward depending on the number of houses present. Of 
course, every time you land on your own property, nothing happens (you do not have to pay 
yourself). Moreover, you can sell your hotels as a whole or in sections. The value of a hotel is 
equal to four houses, which each have a value of 2,000 €, totalling 8,000 € per hotel. If 
another player lands on your property, you receive an amount of 2,000 € of that player, but 
only if there are four houses on your property. Alternatively, you receive 1,500 € for three 
houses, 1,000 € for two houses, and 500 € for one house. 
 
There are also a few differences from the ordinary Monopoly game. Two amusement 
parks (Bollewaerde and Ballibi, each of them divided into two parts) are common property, 
owned by everyone. Every time a player lands on one of these parks, (s)he receives a 
monetary reward, depending on the number of objects (i.e., attractions) present: 2,000 € when 
four or more objects are present, 1,500 € for three objects, 1,000 € for two objects, and 500 € 
for one object. 
 
Ballibi and Bollewaerde are not entirely similar, and they differ in the following ways. 
With Ballibi, the first amusement park, is it possible to request as much money as you want. 
Every seven turns you will be asked to indicate how much money you want. In return, an 
equivalent number of objects are removed from the property. Remember that each attraction 
has a value of 2,000 €.  For example, if players A, B and C each request 2,000 €, four 
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attractions will be removed from Ballibi. If players A, B and C request 0 €, 2,000 € and 
10,000 € respectively, a total of six attractions will be removed.  Another example: If one 
player requests 16,000 €, then all eight attractions will disappear. In the case that there are no 
more attractions on Ballibi, a player will receive no payment when (s)he lands on the 
property. However, if there are four attractions left on Ballibi, you will receive 2,000 € when 
you land on it. When the players ask for an amount that surpasses the value of the objects on 
Ballibi, the bank will subtract the deficit during the next round. 
 
At regular intervals, after every seven turns, the bank will put an attraction on each 
Ballibi lot. Also after every seven turns, each player must inform the bank how much you 
want to collect from Ballibi.  
 
The second amusement park, Bollewaerde, also consists of two parts, but it is another 
type of park. As with Ballibi, every time a player lands on Bollewaerde (s)he receives an 
amount of 2,000 €. After every seventh turn, an attraction is placed on both properties. 
However, unlike the other amusement park, you cannot collect attractions from these 
properties. Also unlike Ballibi, after every seventh turn players may privatize these lots.  
Since Bollewaerde is the property of all three players, in order to privatise a portion of the 
property, a player must purchase it from the other players, through a bidding system. Thus, 
the relevant question here is what do you want to pay to obtain part of Bollewaerde?  Each 
player must also indicate how much (s)he minimally wants to receive from other players who 
want to acquire Bollewaerde. This is called the asking price. If there is a player who is 
prepared to pay a certain amount that is larger than the sum of the asking prices (the total 
price) of the other two players, (s)he obtains Bollewaerde. The player then pays the respective 
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asking prices to the two other players. However, when there is no offer higher than the total 
price, Bollewaerde remains common property.  
 
After every seventh turn, write your secret bid and asking price on separate pieces of 
paper. The bank will check each time whether there is a bid that meets the asking prices.  
 
The impact of privatization is simple. The new owner of Bollewaerde will receive 
money from the other player every time that player visits his/her property. Also, the 
attractions become property of the new owner, and (s)he is able to sell them to the bank. In 
addition, if there are fewer than four attraction on the property, then the amount that the 
owner receives if another player lands on the property is relatively smaller (i.e., 1,500 € for 
three objects, 1,000 € for two objects, and 500 € for one object). Also, take into account that 
after every sequence of seven turns the bank will put an extra attraction on these properties. 
 
Every player receives 20,000 € at the beginning of the game (1 x 10,000; 1 x 5,000; 1 
x 2,000; 1 x 1,000; 4 x 500). If you need to raise money during the game, you are allowed to 
sell your houses. In addition, you can borrow as much money as you want from the bank. 
However, the money you borrowed must be reimbursed to the bank at the end of the game.  
 
At the end of the game, we will calculate your total property. All houses and possible 
attractions (which have been privatized) are worth 2000 €. Moreover, the money you have in 
your possession will also be added. Common property attractions will return to the bank with 
no payment to the players. 
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Appendix B 
 
Anticommons 
 
You are co-owner of an oil well. In addition to your own oil company, four other co-
owning companies operate in the same region. At this very moment co-owner B wants to drill 
part of the well, but the four other companies (including yourself) have to grant their 
permission. You should know that the amount of oil gained by B cannot be gained by you in a 
later phase. You should also know that there is some regeneration because the oil in the well 
grows each year, and as a result the oil can regenerate itself to some extent. Of course, if 
every year the oil is used to a substantial degree, it is obvious that it eventually will disappear.  
Owner B wants to compensate you financially for the part of the well (s)he wants to 
drill. You do not know the exact profit gained by owner B in this case. However, it is certain 
that owner B will try to minimize his/her risks by giving a maximum amount of money. In 
other words, when the selling price rises, the chances diminish that B will buy part of the oil 
well. The total amount of money you can ask B to pay ranges from 0 € to 60 000 €. 
If all companies restrict their asking price to a maximum of 10 000 €, then it is 100 
percent certain that B will buy the oil well. One obvious danger is that the companies will ask 
too much money for their property, making it very likely that B will not buy part of the well, 
leaving the other companies (A, C, D and E) “out in the cold.” Thus, it may be to the four 
companies’ collective advantage to make smaller bids. However, another danger is that a 
company will not do as well because it asks less money than the other three companies. Thus, 
it may be to each company’s individual advantage to make larger bids. It is possible that B 
will buy a part of the oil well if, for example, two companies ask large amounts of money and 
the other company asks a small selling price. 
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We remind you that when all companies ask a high price there is a risk that B will not 
buy the oil well, leaving it underused and unproductive. 
 
I ask a value of… €  Probability that B wants to buy 
part of the oil well, so that the oil 
well is no longer unproductive 
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Commons 
 
You are co-owner of an oil well. In addition to your own oil company, four other co-
owning companies operate in the same region. Each year you have to make a bid stipulating 
how many barrels of oil you want to drill. You do not know how many barrels the other 
companies plan to drill. There is some regeneration of the well because new oil is produced 
each year and hence the oil well can regenerate itself to some extent. The oil you can drill will 
be expressed as an equivalent amount of money ranging between 0 € and 60 000 €. 
If all companies restrict their harvests to a maximum of 10 000 €, then it is 100 percent 
certain that the oil well will regenerate itself completely. One obvious danger is that the well 
eventually will be drilled above the sustainable yield, leaving all five companies “out in the 
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cold.” Thus, it may be to the five companies’ collective advantage to limit their harvests. 
However, another potential danger is that a company does not want to gain less than the other 
four companies. Thus, it may be to each company’s individual advantage to make larger bids. 
However, the oil well may also be preserved if, for example, two companies make large bids 
and two companies make small bids. 
We remind you that when all companies ask a high harvest there is a risk that the oil 
well becomes overused and unproductive.  
 
I take a value of… €  Probability that the oil well 
regenerates itself, so that the 
oil well is no longer 
exhausted 
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Figure1: Use and exclusion in a commons and anticommons regime 
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Figure 2: Game board used in Study 1 
 
 
 
Bollewaerde
 
Bollewaerde
 
C 
 
C 
 
B 
 
B 
 
A 
 
A 
 
Ballibi 
 
Ballibi 
 
Start 
 
 
 
 
 
Commons 
 
Not possible to 
privatize 
 
 
 
 
 
Anticommons: 
 
Possible to 
privatize 
 
 
 
 
 
 33
Welfare effects of commons and anticommons dilemmas 
Figure 3: Mean levels of amount of money taken from the commons and selling prices for the 
anticommons (Study 1) 
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Figure 4: Mean levels of bids in the commons and anticommons dilemmas (Study 2) 
 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
timber oil fund
commons
anticommons
 
 35
